专题：聚焦杰克逊霍尔全球央行年会
来源：智堡Mikko
美联储主席鲍威尔22日上午在怀俄明州杰克逊霍尔举行的美联储年度研讨会上发表了年度讲话。
以下为演讲全文
Over the course of this year， the U.S． economy has shown resilience in a context of sweeping changes in economic policy． In terms of the Fed‘s dual-mandate goals， the labor market remains near maximum employment， and inflation， though still somewhat elevated， has come down a great deal from its post-pandemic highs． At the same time， the balance of risks appears to be shifting．
今年以来，在经济政策发生广泛变化的背景下，美国经济展现出了韧性。就美联储的双重使命目标而言，劳动力市场仍接近充分就业状态，而通货膨胀虽仍有些偏高，但已从疫情后的高点大幅回落。与此同时，风险的平衡似乎正在转变。
In my remarks today， I will first address the current economic situation and the near-term outlook for monetary policy． I will then turn to the results of our second public review of our monetary policy framework， as captured in the revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy that we released today．
在我今天的讲话中，我将首先谈谈当前的经济形势和货币政策的近期展望。然后，我将转向我们今天发布的、经修订的《长期目标与货币政策策略声明》中所体现的、我们第二次货币政策框架公开评估的结果。
Current Economic Conditions and Near-Term Outlook
当前经济状况与近期展望
When I appeared at this podium one year ago， the economy was at an inflection point． Our policy rate had stood at 5-1/4 to 5-1/2 percent for more than a year． That restrictive policy stance was appropriate to help bring down inflation and to foster a sustainable balance between aggregate demand and supply． Inflation had moved much closer to our objective， and the labor market had cooled from its formerly overheated state． Upside risks to inflation had diminished． But the unemployment rate had increased by almost a full percentage point， a development that historically has not occurred outside of recessions． Over the subsequent three Federal Open Market Committee （FOMC） meetings， we recalibrated our policy stance， setting the stage for the labor market to remain in balance near maximum employment over the past year （figure 1）．
一年前我站上这个讲台时，经济正处于一个转折点。我们的政策利率已在5.25%至5.5%的水平上维持了一年多。这种限制性的政策立场是适当的，有助于降低通胀并促进总需求与总供给之间达成可持续的平衡。通胀已非常接近我们的目标，劳动力市场也已从先前过热的状态降温。通胀的上行风险已经减弱。但失业率上升了近一个百分点，这种情况在历史上除了衰退时期外从未发生过。在随后的三次联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）会议上，我们重新校准了我们的政策立场，为过去一年劳动力市场在接近充分就业的水平上保持平衡奠定了基础（图1）。
This year， the economy has faced new challenges． Significantly higher tariffs across our trading partners are remaking the global trading system． Tighter immigration policy has led to an abrupt slowdown in labor force growth． Over the longer run， changes in tax， spending， and regulatory policies may also have important implications for economic growth and productivity． There is significant uncertainty about where all of these polices will eventually settle and what their lasting effects on the economy will be．
今年，经济面临着新的挑战。我们贸易伙伴间大幅提高的关税正在重塑全球贸易体系。更紧的移民政策导致了劳动力增长的突然放缓。从更长远来看，税收、支出和监管政策的变化也可能对经济增长和生产率产生重要影响。所有这些政策最终将走向何方，以及它们对经济的持久影响将是什么，都存在着巨大的不确定性。
Changes in trade and immigration policies are affecting both demand and supply． In this environment， distinguishing cyclical developments from trend， or structural， developments is difficult． This distinction is critical because monetary policy can work to stabilize cyclical fluctuations but can do little to alter structural changes．
贸易和移民政策的变化正在同时影响需求和供给。在这种环境下，区分周期性发展与趋势性（或结构性）发展是困难的。这一区分至关重要，因为货币政策可以努力稳定周期性波动，但对改变结构性变化无能为力。
The labor market is a case in point． The July employment report released earlier this month showed that payroll job growth slowed to an average pace of only 35，000 per month over the past three months， down from 168，000 per month during 2024 （figure 2）． This slowdown is much larger than assessed just a month ago， as the earlier figures for May and June were revised down substantially． But it does not appear that the slowdown in job growth has opened up a large margin of slack in the labor market--an outcome we want to avoid． The unemployment rate， while edging up in July， stands at a historically low level of 4.2 percent and has been broadly stable over the past year． Other indicators of labor market conditions are also little changed or have softened only modestly， including quits， layoffs， the ratio of vacancies to unemployment， and nominal wage growth． Labor supply has softened in line with demand， sharply lowering the “breakeven” rate of job creation needed to hold the unemployment rate constant． Indeed， labor force growth has slowed considerably this year with the sharp falloff in immigration， and the labor force participation rate has edged down in recent months．
劳动力市场就是一个很好的例子。本月早些时候发布的7月份就业报告显示，过去三个月平均每月新增就业岗位放缓至仅3.5万个，低于2024年期间的每月16.8万个（图2）。这一放缓幅度远大于仅一个月前的评估，因为5月和6月的早期数据被大幅下修。但这似乎并未导致劳动力市场出现我们希望避免的大量松弛。失业率虽在7月份略有上升，但仍处于4.2%的历史低位，并在过去一年中基本保持稳定。其他劳动力市场状况指标也变化不大或仅温和走软，包括离职、裁员、职位空缺与失业人数之比以及名义工资增长。劳动力供给与需求同步走软，大幅降低了维持失业率不变所需的“盈亏平衡”就业创造率。事实上，随着移民数量的急剧下降，今年的劳动力增长已显著放缓，劳动力参与率在近几个月也有所下降。
Overall， while the labor market appears to be in balance， it is a curious kind of balance that results from a marked slowing in both the supply of and demand for workers． This unusual situation suggests that downside risks to employment are rising． And if those risks materialize， they can do so quickly in the form of sharply higher layoffs and rising unemployment．
总体而言，虽然劳动力市场看似处于平衡状态，但这是一种由劳动力供给和需求双双显著放缓所导致的奇特平衡状态。这种不寻常的情况表明，就业的下行风险正在上升。而如果这些风险成为现实，它们可能以裁员急剧增加和失业率上升的形式迅速显现。
At the same time， GDP growth has slowed notably in the first half of this year to a pace of 1.2 percent， roughly half the 2.5 percent pace in 2024 （figure 3）． The decline in growth has largely reflected a slowdown in consumer spending． As with the labor market， some of the slowing in GDP likely reflects slower growth of supply or potential output．
与此同时，今年上半年GDP增长已显著放缓至1.2%的水平，约为2024年2.5%增速的一半（图3）。增长的下滑主要反映了消费支出的放缓。与劳动力市场一样，GDP的部分放缓可能反映了供给或潜在产出增长的放缓。
Turning to inflation， higher tariffs have begun to push up prices in some categories of goods． Estimates based on the latest available data indicate that total PCE prices rose 2.6 percent over the 12 months ending in July． Excluding the volatile food and energy categories， core PCE prices rose 2.9 percent， above their level a year ago． Within core， prices of goods increased 1.1 percent over the past 12 months， a notable shift from the modest decline seen over the course of 2024． In contrast， housing services inflation remains on a downward trend， and nonhousing services inflation is still running at a level a bit above what has been historically consistent with 2 percent inflation （figure 4）．
转向通胀方面，更高的关税已开始推高某些类别商品的价格。基于最新可用数据的估计显示，在截至7月的12个月里，总体PCE价格上涨了2.6%。剔除波动的食品和能源类别后，核心PCE价格上涨了2.9%，高于一年前的水平。在核心通胀内部，过去12个月商品价格上涨了1.1%，这与2024年期间出现的温和下降相比是一个显著的转变。相比之下，住房服务通胀仍处于下降趋势，而非住房服务通胀的运行水平仍略高于历史上与2%通胀相符的水平（图4）。
The effects of tariffs on consumer prices are now clearly visible． We expect those effects to accumulate over coming months， with high uncertainty about timing and amounts． The question that matters for monetary policy is whether these price increases are likely to materially raise the risk of an ongoing inflation problem． A reasonable base case is that the effects will be relatively short lived--a one-time shift in the price level． Of course， “one-time” does not mean “all at once．” It will continue to take time for tariff increases to work their way through supply chains and distribution networks． Moreover， tariff rates continue to evolve， potentially prolonging the adjustment process．
关税对消费价格的影响现在已清晰可见。我们预计这些影响将在未来几个月内累积，但其时间和幅度存在高度不确定性。对货币政策而言，重要的问题是，这些价格上涨是否可能实质性地增加持续性通胀问题的风险。一个合理的基准情景是，其影响将是相对短暂的——即物价水平的一次性变动。当然，“一次性”并不意味着“一次完成”。关税上调需要时间才能传导至整个供应链和分销网络。此外，关税税率仍在不断变化，可能会延长调整过程。
It is also possible， however， that the upward pressure on prices from tariffs could spur a more lasting inflation dynamic， and that is a risk to be assessed and managed． One possibility is that workers， who see their real incomes decline because of higher prices， demand and get higher wages from employers， setting off adverse wage--price dynamics． Given that the labor market is not particularly tight and faces increasing downside risks， that outcome does not seem likely．
然而，关税带来的价格上行压力也有可能引发更持久的通胀动态，这是一个需要评估和管理的风险。一种可能性是，因物价上涨而实际收入下降的工人，向雇主提出并获得了更高的工资要求，从而引发不利的工资-物价动态。鉴于劳动力市场并非特别紧张且面临日益增加的下行风险，这种结果似乎不太可能发生。
Another possibility is that inflation expectations could move up， dragging actual inflation with them． Inflation has been above our target for more than four years and remains a prominent concern for households and businesses． Measures of longer-term inflation expectations， however， as reflected in market- and survey-based measures， appear to remain well anchored and consistent with our longer-run inflation objective of 2 percent．
另一种可能性是通胀预期可能上升，并带动实际通胀随之上行。通胀已连续四年多高于我们的目标，并且仍然是家庭和企业的一个突出担忧。然而，从基于市场和调查的指标来看，长期通胀预期似乎仍保持良好锚定，并与我们2%的长期通胀目标相符。
Of course， we cannot take the stability of inflation expectations for granted． Come what may， we will not allow a one-time increase in the price level to become an ongoing inflation problem．
当然，我们不能想当然地认为通胀预期会保持稳定。无论发生什么，我们都不会允许物价水平的一次性上涨演变成一个持续的通胀问题。
Putting the pieces together， what are the implications for monetary policy？ In the near term， risks to inflation are tilted to the upside， and risks to employment to the downside--a challenging situation． When our goals are in tension like this， our framework calls for us to balance both sides of our dual mandate． Our policy rate is now 100 basis points closer to neutral than it was a year ago， and the stability of the unemployment rate and other labor market measures allows us to proceed carefully as we consider changes to our policy stance． Nonetheless， with policy in restrictive territory， the baseline outlook and the shifting balance of risks may warrant adjusting our policy stance．
综合来看，这对货币政策有何启示？在短期内，通胀风险偏向上行，而就业风险偏向下行——这是一个充满挑战的局面。当我们的目标像这样处于紧张关系时，我们的框架要求我们在双重使命的两方面进行平衡。我们的政策利率现在比一年前离中性水平近了100个基点，而失业率和其他劳动力市场指标的稳定性使我们能够在考虑改变政策立场时谨慎行事。尽管如此，在政策处于限制性区域的情况下，基线前景和不断变化的风险平衡可能需要我们调整政策立场。
Monetary policy is not on a preset course． FOMC members will make these decisions， based solely on their assessment of the data and its implications for the economic outlook and the balance ofrisks． We will never deviate from that approach．
货币政策没有预设的路径。联邦公开市场委员会的成员将仅根据他们对数据及其对经济前景和风险平衡影响的评估来做出这些决定。我们永远不会偏离这一方法。
Evolution of Monetary Policy Framework
货币政策框架的演变
Turning to my second topic， our monetary policy framework is built on the unchanging foundation of our mandate from Congress to foster maximum employment and stable prices for the American people． We remain fully committed to fulfilling our statutory mandate， and the revisions to our framework will support that mission across a broad range of economic conditions． Our revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy， which we refer to as our consensus statement， describes how we pursue our dual-mandate goals． It is designed to give the public a clear sense of how we think about monetary policy， and that understanding is important both for transparency and accountability， and for making monetary policy more effective．
转向我的第二个主题，我们的货币政策框架建立在国会授予我们的、为美国人民促进充分就业和稳定物价这一不变的使命基础之上。我们仍然完全致力于履行我们的法定使命，对我们框架的修订将在广泛的经济条件下支持这一使命。我们经修订的《长期目标与货币政策策略声明》，我们称之为共识声明，描述了我们如何追求我们的双重使命目标。它旨在让公众清楚地了解我们如何思考货币政策，而这种理解对于透明度和问责制，以及使货币政策更有效都至关重要。
The changes we made in this review are a natural progression， grounded in our ever-evolving understanding of our economy． We continue to build upon the initial consensus statement adopted in 2012 under Chair Ben Bernanke‘s leadership． Today’s revised statement is the outcome of the second public review of our framework， which we conduct at five-year intervals． This year‘s review included three elements： Fed Listens events at Reserve Banks around the country， a flagship research conference， and policymaker discussions and deliberations， supported by staff analysis， at a series of FOMC meetings．
我们在此次评估中所做的改变是一个自然的演进过程，植根于我们对经济不断深化的理解。我们继续在2012年本·伯南克主席领导下通过的最初共识声明的基础上发展。今天经修订的声明是我们框架第二次公开评估的成果，我们每五年进行一次评估。今年的评估包括三个要素：在全国各储备银行举行的“美联储在倾听”（Fed Listens）活动，一次旗舰研究会议，以及在一系列FOMC会议上由工作人员分析支持的决策者讨论和审议。
In approaching this year‘s review， a key objective has been to make sure that our framework is suitable across a broad range of economic conditions． At the same time， the framework needs to evolve with changes in the structure of the economy and our understanding of those changes． The Great Depression presented different challenges from those of the Great Inflation and the Great Moderation， which in turn are different from the ones we face today．
在进行今年的评估时，一个关键目标是确保我们的框架适用于广泛的经济条件。与此同时，框架需要随着经济结构的变化以及我们对这些变化的理解而演变。大萧条提出的挑战不同于大通胀和大缓和时期的挑战，而这些又与我们今天面临的挑战不同。
At the time of the last review， we were living in a new normal， characterized by the proximity of interest rates to the effective lower bound （ELB）， along with low growth， low inflation， and a very flat Phillips curve--meaning that inflation was not very responsive to slack in the economy． To me， a statistic that captures that era is that our policy rate was stuck at the ELB for seven long years following the onset of the Global Financial Crisis （GFC） in late 2008． Many here will recall the sluggish growth and painfully slow recovery of that era． It appeared highly likely that if the economy experienced even a mild downturn， our policy rate would be back at the ELB very quickly， probably for another extended period． Inflation and inflation expectations could then decline in a weak economy， raising real interest rates as nominal rates were pinned near zero． Higher real rates would further weigh on job growth and reinforce the downward pressure on inflation and inflation expectations， triggering an adverse dynamic．
在上一次评估时，我们生活在一个新常态中，其特点是利率接近有效利率下限（ELB），同时伴随着低增长、低通胀和一条非常平坦的菲利普斯曲线——这意味着通胀对经济中的松弛反应不灵敏。对我而言，一个能捕捉那个时代特征的统计数据是，自2008年末全球金融危机（GFC）爆发后，我们的政策利率在有效利率下限上停留了长达七年之久。在座的许多人都会记得那个时代增长乏力和复苏极其缓慢的痛苦。当时看来，极有可能的情况是，即使经济经历一次温和的衰退，我们的政策利率也会很快回到有效利率下限，并可能再次停留很长一段时间。届时，通胀和通胀预期可能在疲弱的经济中下降，在名义利率被钉在近零水平的情况下推高实际利率。更高的实际利率会进一步拖累就业增长，并加剧通胀和通胀预期的下行压力，从而引发一种不利的动态。
The economic conditions that brought the policy rate to the ELB and drove the 2020 framework changes were thought to be rooted in slow-moving global factors that would persist for an extended period--and might well have done so， if not for the pandemic． The 2020 consensus statement included several features that addressed the ELB-related risks that had become increasingly prominent over the preceding two decades． We emphasized the importance of anchored longer-term inflation expectations to support both our price-stability and maximum-employment goals． Drawing on an extensive literature on strategies to mitigate risks associated with the ELB， we adopted flexible average inflation targeting--a “makeup” strategy to ensure that inflation expectations would remain well anchored even with the ELB constraint． In particular， we said that， following periods when inflation had been running persistently below 2 percent， appropriate monetary policy would likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time．
那些将政策利率推至有效利率下限并推动2020年框架变革的经济状况，被认为根植于缓慢变化的全球性因素，这些因素将持续很长一段时间——如果不是因为疫情，它们很可能确实如此。2020年的共识声明包含了几个应对过去二十年日益突出的、与有效利率下限相关风险的特征。我们强调了锚定长期通胀预期对于支持我们价格稳定和充分就业双重目标的重要性。借鉴大量关于减轻有效利率下限相关风险策略的文献，我们采纳了灵活形式的平均通胀目标制——一种“弥补”策略，以确保即使在有效利率下限的约束下，通胀预期也能保持良好锚定。具体来说，我们表示，在通胀持续低于2%的时期过后，适当的货币政策可能会在一段时间内旨在实现适度高于2%的通胀。
In the event， rather than low inflation and the ELB， the post-pandemic reopening brought the highest inflation in 40 years to economies around the world． Like most other central banks and private-sector analysts， through year-end 2021 we thought that inflation would subside fairly quickly without a sharp tightening in our policy stance （figure 5）． When it became clear that this was not the case， we responded forcefully， raising our policy rate by 5.25 percentage points over 16 months． That action， combined with the unwinding of pandemic supply disruptions， contributed to inflation moving much closer to our target without the painful rise in unemployment that has accompanied previous efforts to counter high inflation．
结果，后疫情时期的重新开放带来的不是低通胀和有效利率下限，而是全球经济体40年来最高的通胀。像大多数其他央行和私营部门分析师一样，直到2021年底，我们都认为通胀会在没有我们大幅收紧政策立场的情况下相当快地消退（图5）。当情况变得明朗并非如此时，我们做出了强有力的回应，在16个月内将我们的政策利率提高了5.25个百分点。这一行动，加上疫情期间供应中断的缓解，促使通胀在没有伴随以往抗击高通胀时出现的痛苦的失业率上升的情况下，更接近我们的目标。
Elements of the Revised Consensus Statement
经修订的共识声明的要素
This year‘s review considered how economic conditions have evolved over the past five years． During this period， we saw that the inflation situation can change rapidly in the face of large shocks． In addition， interest rates are now substantially higher than was the case during the era between the GFC and the pandemic． With inflation above target， our policy rate is restrictive--modestly so， in my view． We cannot say for certain where rates will settle out over the longer run， but their neutral level may now be higher than during the 2010s， reflecting changes in productivity， demographics， fiscal policy， and other factors that affect the balance between saving and investment （figure 6）． During the review， we discussed how the 2020 statement’s focus on the ELB may have complicated communications about our response to high inflation． We concluded that the emphasis on an overly specific set of economic conditions may have led to some confusion， and， as a result， we made several important changes to the consensus statement to reflect that insight．
今年的评估考虑了过去五年经济状况的演变。在此期间，我们看到在巨大冲击面前，通胀形势可以迅速改变。此外，现在的利率水平远高于全球金融危机与疫情之间时期的水平。在通胀高于目标的情况下，我们的政策利率是限制性的——在我看来，是温和的限制性。我们无法确定利率在长期内将稳定在何处，但其中性水平现在可能高于2010年代，这反映了生产率、人口结构、财政政策以及其他影响储蓄与投资平衡因素的变化（图6）。在评估期间，我们讨论了2020年声明对有效利率下限的关注，可能如何使我们对高通胀回应的沟通变得复杂。我们得出结论，对一套过于特定的经济条件的强调可能导致了一些困惑，因此，我们对共识声明做出了几项重要修改以反映这一见解。
First， we removed language indicating that the ELB was a defining feature of the economic landscape． Instead， we noted that our “monetary policy strategy is designed to promote maximum employment and stable prices across a broad range of economic conditions．” The difficulty of operating near the ELB remains a potential concern， but it is not our primary focus． The revised statement reiterates that the Committee is prepared to use its full range of tools to achieve its maximum-employment and price-stability goals， particularly if the federal funds rate is constrained by the ELB．
首先，我们删除了表明有效利率下限是经济格局决定性特征的措辞。相反，我们指出，我们的“货币政策策略旨在在广泛的经济条件下促进充分就业和稳定物价”。在有效利率下限附近操作的困难仍然是一个潜在的担忧，但它不是我们的主要焦点。经修订的声明重申，委员会准备好使用其全部工具来实现其充分就业和价格稳定的目标，特别是在联邦基金利率受到有效利率下限约束的情况下。
Second， we returned to a framework of flexible inflation targeting and eliminated the “makeup” strategy． As it turned out， the idea of an intentional， moderate inflation overshoot had proved irrelevant． There was nothing intentional or moderate about the inflation that arrived a few months after we announced our 2020 changes to the consensus statement， as I acknowledged publicly in 2021．
其次，我们回归了灵活通胀目标制的框架，并取消了“弥补”策略。事实证明，有意让通胀适度超调的想法已变得无关紧要。在我们宣布2020年共识声明修改后的几个月里到来的通胀，既非有意也非适度，这一点我已在2021年公开承认。
Well-anchored inflation expectations were critical to our success in bringing down inflation without a sharp increase in unemployment． Anchored expectations promote the return of inflation to target when adverse shocks drive inflation higher， and limit the risk of deflation when the economy weakens． Further， they allow monetary policy to support maximum employment in economic downturns without compromising price stability． Our revised statement emphasizes our commitment to act forcefully to ensure that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored， to the benefit of both sides of our dual mandate． It also notes that “price stability is essential for a sound and stable economy and supports the well-being of all Americans．” This theme came through loud and clear at our Fed Listens events． The past five years have been a painful reminder of the hardship that high inflation imposes， especially on those least able to meet the higher costs of necessities．
良好锚定的通胀预期对于我们在没有导致失业率急剧上升的情况下成功降低通胀至关重要。锚定的预期在不利冲击推高通胀时能促进通胀回归目标，并在经济疲软时限制通缩风险。此外，它们允许货币政策在经济衰退时支持充分就业而不损害价格稳定。我们经修订的声明强调，我们致力于采取有力行动，确保长期通胀预期保持良好锚定，以利于我们双重使命的两方面。声明还指出，“价格稳定是健全稳定经济的基础，并支持所有美国人的福祉。”这一主题在我们的“美联储在倾听”活动中得到了响亮而清晰的体现。过去五年痛苦地提醒我们，高通胀带来的困难，特别是对那些最无力承担必需品更高成本的人们。
Third， our 2020 statement said that we would mitigate “shortfalls，” rather than “deviations，” from maximum employment． The use of “shortfalls” reflected the insight that our real-time assessments of the natural rate of unemployment--and hence of “maximum employment”--are highly uncertain． The later years of the post-GFC recovery featured employment running for an extended period above mainstream estimates of its sustainable level， along with inflation running persistently below our 2 percent target． In the absence of inflationary pressures， it might not be necessary to tighten policy based solely on uncertain real-time estimates of the natural rate of unemployment．
第三，我们2020年的声明称，我们将致力于减轻与充分就业之间的“不足”（shortfalls），而非“偏离”（deviations）。使用“不足”一词反映了这样一种见解，即我们对自然失业率——也就是“充分就业”——的实时评估是高度不确定的。在全球金融危机后复苏的后期，就业在很长一段时间内都高于主流对其可持续水平的估计，而通胀则持续低于我们2%的目标。在没有通胀压力的情况下，可能没有必要仅仅基于不确定的自然失业率实时估计来收紧政策。
We still have that view， but our use of the term “shortfalls” was not always interpreted as intended， raising communications challenges． In particular， the use of “shortfalls” was not intended as a commitment to permanently forswear preemption or to ignore labor market tightness． Accordingly， we removed “shortfalls” from our statement． Instead， the revised document now states more precisely that “the Committee recognizes that employment may at times run above real-time assessments of maximum employment without necessarily creating risks to price stability．” Of course， preemptive action would likely be warranted if tightness in the labor market or other factors pose risks to price stability．
我们仍然持有这一观点，但我们对“不足”一词的使用并未总能按预期被解读，从而带来了沟通上的挑战。特别是，使用“不足”一词并非意在承诺永久放弃先发制人的行动或忽视劳动力市场的紧张状况。因此，我们从声明中删除了“不足”一词。相反，经修订的文件现在更精确地指出，“委员会认识到，就业有时可能会高于对充分就业的实时评估，而不必然对价格稳定构成风险。”当然，如果劳动力市场的紧张或其他因素对价格稳定构成风险，采取先发制人的行动可能是必要的。
The revised statement also notes that maximum employment is “the highest level of employment that can be achieved on a sustained basis in a context of price stability．” This focus on promoting a strong labor market underscores the principle that “durably achieving maximum employment fosters broad-based economic opportunities and benefits for all Americans．” The feedback we received at Fed Listens events reinforced the value of a strong labor market for American households， employers， and communities．
经修订的声明还指出，充分就业是“在价格稳定的背景下可以持续实现的最高就业水平”。这种对促进强劲劳动力市场的关注，强调了“持久地实现充分就业能为所有美国人带来基础广泛的经济机会和利益”的原则。我们在“美联储在倾听”活动中收到的反馈，强化了强劲劳动力市场对美国家庭、雇主和社区的价值。
Fourth， consistent with the removal of “shortfalls，” we made changes to clarify our approach in periods when our employment and inflation objectives are not complementary． In those circumstances， we will follow a balanced approach in promoting them． The revised statement now more closely aligns with the original 2012 language． We take into account the extent of departures from our goals and the potentially different time horizons over which each is projected to return to a level consistent with our dual mandate． These principles guide our policy decisions today， as they did over the 2022--24 period， when the departure from our 2 percent inflation target was the overriding concern．
第四，与删除“不足”一词相一致，我们做出了修改，以阐明在我们的就业和通胀目标不互补的时期我们的方法。在这些情况下，我们将采取一种平衡的方法来促进它们。经修订的声明现在与2012年的原始措辞更为一致。我们会考虑偏离我们目标的程度，以及预计每个目标回归到与我们双重使命相符水平的可能不同时间跨度。这些原则指导着我们今天的政策决定，就像它们在2022-24年期间指导我们一样，当时偏离我们2%通胀目标是压倒一切的担忧。
In addition to these changes， there is a great deal of continuity with past statements． The document continues to explain how we interpret the mandate Congress has given us and describes the policy framework that we believe will best promote maximum employment and price stability． We continue to believe that monetary policy must be forward looking and consider the lags in its effects on the economy． For this reason， our policy actions depend on the economic outlook and the balance of risks to that outlook． We continue to believe that setting a numerical goal for employment is unwise， because the maximum level of employment is not directly measurable and changes over time for reasons unrelated to monetary policy．
除了这些变化，与过去的声明也有很大的连续性。该文件继续解释我们如何解读国会赋予我们的使命，并描述我们认为将最好地促进充分就业和价格稳定的政策框架。我们继续认为，货币政策必须是前瞻性的，并考虑其对经济影响的时滞。因此，我们的政策行动取决于经济前景以及该前景面临的风险平衡。我们继续认为，为就业设定一个数字目标是不明智的，因为充分就业的水平无法直接衡量，并且会因与货币政策无关的原因随时间变化。
We also continue to view a longer-run inflation rate of 2 percent as most consistent with our dual-mandate goals． We believe that our commitment to this target is a key factor helping keep longer-term inflation expectations well anchored． Experience has shown that 2 percent inflation is low enough to ensure that inflation is not a concern in household and business decisionmaking while also providing a central bank with some policy flexibility to provide accommodation during economic downturns．
我们也继续认为，2%的长期通胀率最符合我们的双重使命目标。我们相信，我们对这一目标的承诺是帮助保持长期通胀预期良好锚定的一个关键因素。经验表明，2%的通胀率足够低，可以确保通胀不会成为家庭和企业决策中的一个担忧，同时也为央行在经济衰退期间提供宽松政策提供了一些灵活性。
Finally， the revised consensus statement retained our commitment to conduct a public review roughly every five years． There is nothing magic about a five-year pace． That frequency allows policymakers to reassess structural features of the economy and to engage with the public， practitioners， and academics on the performance of our framework． It is also consistent with several global peers．
最后，经修订的共识声明保留了我们大约每五年进行一次公开评估的承诺。五年这个节奏并没有什么神奇之处。这个频率允许决策者重新评估经济的结构性特征，并与公众、从业者和学者就我们框架的表现进行交流。这也与几个全球同行的做法相一致。
Conclusion
结论
In closing， I want to thank President Schmid and all his staff who work so diligently to host this outstanding event annually． Counting a couple of virtual appearances during the pandemic， this is the eighth time I have had the honor to speak from this podium． Each year， this symposium offers the opportunity for Federal Reserve leaders to hear ideas from leading economic thinkers and focus on the challenges we face． The Kansas City Fed was wise to lure Chair Volcker to this national park more than 40 years ago， and I am proud to be part of that tradition．
最后，我要感谢施密德主席和他所有辛勤工作以每年举办这一杰出活动的工作人员。算上疫情期间的几次线上露面，这已是我第八次有幸在这个讲台上发言。每年，这个研讨会都为美联储的领导者们提供机会，听取顶尖经济思想家的想法，并专注于我们面临的挑战。四十多年前，堪萨斯城联储将沃尔克主席吸引到这个国家公园是明智之举，我很自豪能成为这一传统的一部分。
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